We estimate the pricing of sovereign risk for fifty countries based on fiscal space (debt/tax; deficits/tax) and other economic fundamentals over 2005-10. We measure how accurately the model predicts sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, focusing in particular on the five countries in the South-West Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Dynamic panel estimates of the model suggest that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically significant and economically important determinants of market-based sovereign risk. However, risk-pricing of the South-West Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately by the model either in-sample or out-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident during global crisis period, especially in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We "match" the periphery group with five middle income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal space during the European fiscal crisis. We find that Eurozone periphery default risk is priced much higher than the "matched" countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in fundamentals. One interpretation is that the market has mispriced risk in the Eurozone periphery. An alternative interpretation is that the market is pricing not on current fundamentals but future fundamentals, expecting the periphery fiscal space to deteriorate markedly and posing a high risk of debt restructuring. Adjustment challenges of the Eurozone periphery may be perceived as economically and politically more difficult than the matched group of middle income countries because of exchange rate and monetary constraints.
Introduction
During 2000 to 2006, the OECD and most emerging markets experienced a remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility and the price of risk. This period turned out to be the tail-end of the Great Moderation, a precursor of the turbulences leading to the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the consequent increase in risk premia, and the focus on fiscal challenges and the importance of fiscal space in navigating future economic challenges. The latter stages of the crisis, unfolding in 2010, focused attention on the heterogeneity of the Euro block, and the unique challenges facing the five SouthWest Eurozone Periphery countries, or SWEAP group (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), in adjusting to fiscal fragility in the context of a ten-year old currency union.
1
This paper investigates the pricing of risk associated with the sovereign debt crisis that escalated during 2010 in several European countries. Our objective is to determine whether the perception of relatively high sovereign default risk of the fiscally distressed Euro area countries, as seen in market pricing of credit default swap (CDS) spreads, may be explained by existing past or current fundamentals of debt and deficits relative to tax revenues -which we term de facto fiscal space -and other economic determinants. 2 Our analysis allows us to address several questions. Does fiscal space help systematically explain the evolution of the market pricing of risk beyond that embedded in other macroeconomic indicators? Was risk in some markets (e.g. SWEAP) "overpriced" in 1 The SWEAP acronym for these five countries is used in Buiter and Rahbari (2010) . 2 Our measure of fiscal space is from Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010) . They propose a stock and flow measure of de facto fiscal space. The stock variable is defined as the inverse of the tax-years it would take to repay the public debt. In this paper, fiscal space is measured both as outstanding government debt and government deficits, relative to the de facto tax base. The deficits measure is the realized tax collection, averaged across several years to smooth for business cycle fluctuations. 2010 judging by model predictions using the prevailing values of fiscal space other macro variables?
Our objectives for the empirical work are three-fold. Firstly, we determine whether CDS spreads (in a panel regression setting) are related to fiscal space measures and other economic determinants. Secondly, we address whether there is an identifiable dynamic pattern to CDS spreads during the crisis period. Thirdly, we investigate pricing differentials of CDS spreads in the Euro area, and the SWEAP in particular, compared to other countries. We seek to answer the question of whether Euro area and SWEAP CDS spreads follow the same pattern as the rest of the world or may they considered "mispriced" in some sense, especially during the 2010 European debt crisis.
To this end, we develop a pricing model of sovereign risk for a large number of countries (60) within and outside of Europe, before and after the global financial crisis, based on fiscal space and other economic fundamentals including the foreign interest rate, external debt, trade openness, nominal depreciation, inflation, GDP/Capita and economic growth. We use this dynamic panel model to explain CDS spreads and determine whether the market pricing of risk is comparable in the affected European countries and elsewhere in the world. By this methodology, and using in-sample and outof-sample predictions, we can determine whether there are systematically large prediction errors for the CDS spreads during the global financial crisis and in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis in Europe intensified. Systematically large prediction errors may be due to mispricing of risk or may be attributable to expectations of a future decline in fundamentals that lead to higher default risk. We also "match," on the basis of similar fiscal space, each SWEAP country with a corresponding Middle Income country. This provides additional information on the market pricing of risk between SWEAP and countries with similar fiscal conditions but, unlike SWEAP, with histories of debt restructuring.
Our investigation reveals a complex and time-varying environment in the market for sovereign default risk. Specifically, we find empirically a key role of fiscal space in pricing sovereign risk, controlling for other relevant macro variables. The link is economically and statistically strong, and robust to the time dimension of the CDS premium, sample period, included control variables and estimation technique. We find that risk of default in the SWEAP group appeared to be somewhat "underpriced" relative to international norms in the period prior to the global financial crisis and substantially "overpriced" countries during and after the crisis, especially in 2010, with actual CDS values much higher than the model would predict given fundamentals. In addition, compared to the matched group, controlling for fiscal space and macroeconomic conditions, all of the SWEAP countries have much higher default risk assessments measured by CDS premiums.
The next section discusses the data. The third section provides a preliminary statistical analysis. The fourth section presents the empirical results. We close the paper with a discussion on possible interpretation of the emerging SWEAP risk premia, including the handicapping effect of being a member of a currency union, which reduces the country's scope of adjustment via exchange rate and monetary policy.
CDS Spreads as a Measure of Sovereign Default Risk

CDS Spreads on Sovereign Bonds
We measure the market perception of sovereign default risk by the spreads on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) at various maturities (tenors). 3 CDS instruments are mainly transacted in over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets. The spreads represent the quarterly payments that must be paid by the buyer of CDS to the seller for the contingent claim in the case of a credit event, in this case non-payment (or forced restructuring) of sovereign debt, and is therefore an excellent proxy for market-based default risk pricing. 4 The total CDS market grew from about 10 trillion USD in 2004, when statistics were first systematically reported, to a peak prior to the global financial crisis of almost 60 trillion USD in mid-2008, and then fell sharply. The estimated gross (net) notional amount of sovereign CDS outstanding was 2,447 (233) billion USD in 2010, compared to about 2,196 billion USD in government-issued international debt securities (BIS, 2010) . Figure 1 shows the outstanding notional amounts of CDS instruments on sovereign bonds across countries in late February 2011. Italy has the largest outstanding CDS notional amounts, at almost USD 300 billion, followed by Brazil, Spain and Turkey with notional amounts outstanding of over USD 150 billion.
3 See Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) for discussions of sovereign CDS markets. 4 An alternative proxy for default risk is the interest rate spread of sovereign debt. From an empirical standpoint, there are three main advantages of using CDS spreads rather than interest rate spreads. Firstly, CDS statistics provide timelier market-based pricing with larger coverage of industrial and developing countries than sources for national bond market rates. Secondly, using CDS spreads avoids the difficulty in dealing with time to maturity as in the case of using interest rate spreads (of which the zero yields would be preferred). Recent estimates from the Bank for International Settlements suggest that the average original and the remaining maturities of government debt instruments vary markedly across countries (BIS, 2010) . Thirdly, interest rate spreads embed inflation expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions as well as default risk. We are only interested in default risk.
Sovereign CDS provide a market-based real time indicator of sovereign credit quality and default risk. We consider sovereign CDS spreads at several maturities-three, five and ten-year maturities, across industrial countries and emerging markets. Despite the low probability of a credit event in most advanced economies, CDS markets are still active in most markets as buyers can use the sovereign CDS as a hedge and for mark-tomarket response. 5 Buyers of the sovereign CDS may or may not own the underlying government bonds. The latter case is termed 'naked' sovereign CDS, and frequently labeled as a speculation.
CDS prices in our study are taken from CMA Datavision, a platform that is based on quotes collected from a consortium of over thirty independent swap market participants. CMA aggregates the most recent quotes and delivers the data intraday. The quoting convention for CDSs is the annual premium payment as a percentage of the notional amount of the reference obligation. The sovereign CDS spreads are reported in basis points, with a basis point equals to $1,000 to insure $10 million of debt. 6 CDS spreads are London closing values. While CMA is not the sole provider of CDS prices, Mayordomo et al. (2010) find that, in a comparison of six major providers, CMA quotes are most consistent with a price discovery process. The majority of sovereign CDS in the market are denominated in the US dollar; in our sample, about one-third of the CDS is Euro-denominated. The CMA data set provides a broad coverage of CDS pricing over countries and years.
5 Sovereign CDS can also be used to supplement corporate CDS to hedge for country risk. 6 For example, if the spread is 197 basis points, meaning 197,000 USD to insure against 10,000,000 in sovereign debt for 10 years; 1.97% of notional amount needs to be paid each year, so 0.0197 x 10 million = $197,000 per year.
Appendix A provides data sources and Appendix B a list of countries in the entire sample, the subset of countries included in the empirical estimation, and means of 3, 5 and10-year CDS spreads (in basis points), fiscal space and other macroeconomic indicators during the sample (2005-10).
Empirical Studies on CDS Spreads
Empirical studies of CDS (corporate and sovereign) are relatively new and usually deal with market microstructure issues. Our study, by contrast, is in line with the macro/international finance literature which considers macroeconomic determinants of country risk assessments and financial crises.
Several findings are particularly relevant to our analysis. As noted by Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) and others, the CDS premium should in principle be approximately equal to the credit spread of the reference bond of the same maturity under certain conditions. However, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) demonstrate that the "basis",
i.e. difference between CDS spreads and the spreads on the underlying government bonds, was not zero in Eurozone CDS markets during late 2010. They suggest that sizable deviations are attributable to limits to arbitrage and slow moving capital.
Secondly, at high frequency (intraday), differences in credit quality (measured by CDS prices) are found to explain sovereign yield spreads of the Euro area governments (Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz, 2009 decline in the appetite for credit-risky instruments and falling market liquidity rather than entirely due concerns about principle losses on outstanding sovereign debt. In addition, empirical research finds that daily sovereign interest spreads are more likely to lead sovereign CDS spreads in emerging markets (Ammer and Cai, 2007) . 8 Taken together, both studies suggest that sovereign interest rates and CDS spreads have common underlying causes, rather than one driving the other.
There is evidence that CDS spreads may be driven by macro economic conditions. Amato (2005) decomposes CDS spreads into risk premium and risk aversion and finds that both are influenced by macroeconomic conditions. Packer and Zhu (2005) find that contractual terms influence CDS spreads, but that significant "regional effects"
(differential pricing across regions) is also evident. Micu et al. (2006) 
Statistical Contours
Monthly 5 As our main objective is to investigate the link between fiscal space and the pricing of default risk, we also track the adjustment of fiscal capacity across countries. (and debt/gdp) and deficit/tax (deficit/gdp), in the two panels of Figure 3 by country group. Lower pre-crisis government debt and lower fiscal deficits relative to the tax base imply greater fiscal capacity. The figure shows that fiscal space was weakest (highest levels of debt and deficits relative to the tax base) in the middle-income countries, although the average debt to gdp ratio was lower than the other groups. This reflects generally lower tax bases in the middle income countries. Generally, the SWEAP had more limited fiscal space during the tranquil period than other high-income groupshigher average debt and deficits to the relative to the tax base (despite a significant budget surplus in Ireland during this period), and a higher level of debt to GDP.
Methodology and Empirical Results
Methodology
The dependent variables in our formal empirical work are sovereign CDS spreads of 5 year maturity (regressions with 3 and 10-year maturities are shown in the appendix 
where y is the 10 Our CDS data set contains 1-10 year maturities. We focus on the 5-year maturity since this is the deepest and most actively traded CDS market. While there is no precise We also consider for GMM the dependent variable in log multiplied by a hundred, allowing the coefficients to be interpreted in terms of a percentage change of sovereign default risks (this terminology also aligns with standard practice in the financial sector that discusses the percentage change of CDS spreads).
international account of government debt maturity, recent statistics suggest that the average original maturity of central government debts is around 10 years for both emerging markets and industrial countries (BIS, 2010) . Hence, we also report results for 10-year maturities in the appendix, as well as 3-year maturities for a robustness test. 
Dynamics of CDS Spreads and Euro/SWEAP Pricing Differentials
CDS Spreads, Fundamentals and Structural Change
The focus on dynamics highlight how SWEAP experienced much higher CDS spreads than most of the world in 2010, even controlling for their deteriorating fiscal situation and other factors. Table 3 The estimates for the full sample in Table 3 are included for comparison with the results in Table 2 which include time dummies and interactive terms. The results, not surprisingly, are very similar. However, important differences are evident in the estimates from the two sub-samples. In particular, all of the fiscal space estimates are highly statistically and economically important in the pre-crisis "tranquil" 2005-07 sample, shown in columns 5-8. Debt and deficits relative to the tax base clearly lead to much higher risk assessments and CDS spreads.
As noted, a structural break appears to have occurred during the turbulent 2008-10 crisis episode, shown in columns 9-12. During the crisis, pricing of risk is largely decoupled from our two fiscal space measures. The ability of the model to explain CDS spreads drops from around 70-80% in the tranquil period to 45-60% during the crisis.
Although explanatory power of fiscal space measures drop during the crisis, the TED spread, trade openness, external debt and inflation play a larger role. Given turbulent conditions during the crisis period, markets apparently did not focus on current fiscal fundamentals. One interpretation is that the markets simply overreacted and mispriced risk of default. Another interpretation is that markets may have emphasized more on expectations of future deterioration in fiscal space that were not fully reflected in current economic conditions. 12 The emergence of the TED spread as a key pricing factor in the crisis also suggests that expectations of market volatility jumped during the crisis and that this pushed up CDS spreads. In particular, possible default implies that the payoff to creditors is weakly concave (fixed payoff in good times, declining with an adverse shock above a threshold in bad times), suggesting that higher volatility will reduce the expected payoff in countries exposed to higher volatility during a crisis for a given debt/tax or debt/gdp and thereby increasing CDS spreads. 13 This also explains the impact of the end of the Great Moderation-countries with greater exposure to volatility, other things equal, are facing higher spreads.
4.3 SWEAP and the Euro-Area CDS Pricing Before and During the Crisis 12 We also investigated whether the pricing of CDS spreads amongst the SWEAP and the non-SWEAP Euro countries (Euro-SWEAP) respond differently to fundamentals than the rest of world when the full set of fundamental explanatory variables is included. We estimated the model over 2005-10, reflecting the full sample and consisting of both the tranquil and turbulent periods. We focused on 10-year CDS spreads and considered interaction terms of SWEAP and Euro-SWEAP with all of the fundamental variables. The point estimates of interaction terms on government debt/tax suggest that the non-SWEAP Euro area countries have much narrower spreads than the sample average and the SWEAP area have much larger spreads. However, these differences are not statistically significant. The same result holds for the other fundamental factors. One exception is the trade openness variable: on average, trade openness is positively associated with CDS spreads, but less than average for non-SWEAP Euro area and more than average for SWEAP. We omit these results for brevity. They are available upon request. 13 A related point is made by Aizenman and Marion (2002) .
In order to determine how the balanced sample (2005-10) and pre-crisis sample (2005-07) models of Table 3 predict for various country groups and the SWEAP countries, we report the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction errors over various years in Table 4 . Our objective is to determine whether prediction errors demonstrate a discernable pattern. The in-sample prediction errors are estimated from the full sample model estimates reported in column 3 of Table 3 and the out-of-sample errors are estimated from the pre-crisis sample estimates reported in column 9 of Table 3 .
For exposition purposes, we calculate the prediction errors in Table 4 as a ratio of the actual relative to the predicted CDS spreads as:
. 5
Hence, if the prediction error is greater than 1, we have a case of under-prediction which provides supportive evidence that the CDS is over-priced. Table 4 Fiscal conditions in Euro countries less the SWEAP were in line with other countries prior to the global financial crisis. The average debt/tax ratio (1.38) was lower than the average of other OECD countries (1.66). The Euro area debt/GDP (55%) was slightly higher than other OECD countries (51%). The SWEAP group had a somewhat worse fiscal position, but not markedly so, with an average debt/tax ratio of 1.94 over the period, somewhat above the non-Euro OECD group average (1.66). This is much less than the average for the middle income group (2.75). However, the SWEAP debt to GDP ratio was higher than the other groups at an average 68% over the period running up to the financial crisis. A similar pattern is seen for fiscal balance measures, shown in the second part of Figure 3 . countries (using equations 6 and 8 from Table 3 ). The left panels show the debt/tax revenue measure and the right panels show the deficit/tax revenue fiscal space measure.
The correlation in the Euro zone (non-Euro area) between government debt/tax revenues and prediction error is -.72 (-.28). And the correlation in the Euro zone (non-Euro area) between fiscal balances to tax revenues and prediction error is .59 (.09) for other (non Euro) countries in the sample. Euro area countries with high debt and deficits (surpluses) during the pre-crisis period experienced lower (higher) CDS spreads (relative to predicted values) than did the non-Euro area countries.
Overall, these data do not support the argument that the market was particularly sanguine about Euro area sovereign risk during the tranquil period and that this led to an over-reaction (over pricing risk) during the crisis period. CDS spreads relative to out-ofsample predicted values in the SWEAP group are high, but not out of line with other country groups. Moreover, there is no evidence that debt and deficits in the SWEAP countries prior to the crisis led to high prediction errors during the crisis. large (small) prediction errors in the tranquil period tend to be followed by small (large) prediction errors in the crisis period. However, there is a wide asymmetry between the clusters of errors of the SWEAP and the clusters of errors of their matched MI countries.
In particular, the relatively small prediction errors of the SWEAP countries in the precrisis period are followed by quite large prediction errors in the crisis period. By contrast, little relation is seen in the error clusters of the MI countries-a wide variation among the prediction errors in this group in the pre-crisis period is not seen in the crisis period, during which time all of the matched MI country predictions were quite close to realized CDS spreads.
The data in Figure 5 suggest that sovereign risk in SWEAP countries is overpriced in comparison with corresponding MI countries. Pursuing this further, Table 5 summarizes in more detail the characteristics of the SWEAP with the matched countries.
The table shows, before and during the crisis, the evolution of CDS spreads, fiscal space, the tax base, inflation, currency depreciation, inflation external debt, foreign reserves, trade openness and real GDP growth.
This table allows a detailed comparison of the matched countries. In terms of initial conditions, for example, Italy and Mexico had very similar debt/tax ratios in 2005-07 (2.2-2.5), but Mexico had much higher borrowing costs and sovereign CDS premium which were more than four times higher than Italy (57 points versus 13 points).
Differential borrowing costs, however, were consistent with a weaker currency and higher inflation rates in Mexico. The difference in CDS spreads between the two countries at this time appears is in line with relative fiscal space-similar debt and deficit positions--and economic performance. By 2010, however, the roles were reversed: Italy had a CDS spread of 238 and Mexico 113, despite still having very similar debt/tax and deficit/tax ratios and Mexico maintaining higher rates of inflation. Pessimism about
Europe in 2010 appears to have led to higher risk perceptions in Italy compared to Mexico than would be justified by fundamentals. This observation is seen as well in Figure 5 , where the prediction errors for 2008-10 averaged about 1.0 in Mexico and 2.6
in Italy. (It should be noted, however, that real GDP growth was stronger in Mexico than
Italy at this time, and its currency stronger. So not all fundamentals pointed to more equal CDS spreads).
Another illustrative case is Spain and South Africa. The 2005-07 (debt/tax) ratios were very similar, but South Africa was subject to higher government borrowing costs and had a substantially higher CDS spread (53 points versus 17 points). Partly this reflected the respective political situations but also that South Africa had higher inflation and a higher rate of currency depreciation. Again, the market pricing of risk was reversed in the two countries by 2010 with the CDS spread in Spain averaging 348 points compared to 124 in South Africa. This difference may be partly due to fundamentalsreal GDP growth was higher and the debt/tax ratio lower in South Africa. On the other hand, the inflation rate in South Africa was almost 6% in 2010, compared to less than 3%
in Spain. The suspicion that default risk in Spain is mispriced compared to South Africa is also suggested by the prediction error given in Figure 5 -the average CDS spread to predicted spread for Spain during 2008-10 is almost 4 but about 1 in South Africa, where the later indicates no under-or over-pricing.
On the other hand, Table 3 (as summarized in Table 4 ). The prediction error is the actual CDS divided by the predicted CDS; when >1, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced). This figure plots 2008-10 prediction errors on CDS 5-year tenor on the vertical axis. The 2005-07 fiscal space is on the horizontal axis. Table 3 (as summarized in Table 4 ). The circle size is proportional to 2005-07 public debt/tax base. The prediction error is the actual CDS divided by the predicted CDS; when >1, there is a signal of under-prediction (i.e. the sovereign default risk is over-priced). This figure 
